COLD WAR DYNAMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERPLAY OF TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

**Purpose:** This article investigates the primary determinants of Turkish-American relations during the Cold War, focusing on key events and policies that influenced bilateral interactions. It aims to understand the impact of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO alliances, the Cyprus issue, and the Kurdish conflict on these relations. The study also critically assesses the role of ethnic lobbies, such as the Armenian and Greek communities, in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey.

**Method:** Utilizing a comprehensive historical analysis, this research draws on different sources including speeches, and official correspondences, as well as secondary sources such as academic books, journal articles, and theses. This methodological approach allows for an in-depth exploration of the complex interplay between domestic politics and international diplomacy.

**Conclusion:** The study reveals that Turkish-American relations during the Cold War were shaped by a combination of strategic alliances, regional conflicts, and domestic political influences. Key policies like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were instrumental in solidifying Turkey as a critical ally, while events such as the Cyprus issue and the Kurdish conflict presented significant challenges. The influence of ethnic lobbies also played a crucial role in shaping bilateral relations.

**Implication of the Research:** The insights gained from this analysis provide valuable lessons for future diplomatic efforts, emphasizing the need for cooperation, diversification of partnerships, and strategic alignment. Understanding the historical context of Turkish-American relations can inform current and future diplomacy, helping to navigate the complexities of this bilateral relationship.

**Originality of the Research:** This research offers a unique and comprehensive examination of Turkish-American relations during the Cold War, incorporating a critical assessment of both strategic policies and the influence of ethnic lobbies. By providing a nuanced understanding of these factors, the study contributes original insights to the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis.

**Keywords:** Turkish-American Relations, Cold War, Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Ethnic Lobbies.

“DINÂMICA DA GUERRA FRIA: A INTERAÇÃO ESTRATÉGICA DAS RELAÇÕES TURCO-AMERICANAS”

RESUMO

**Objectivo:** Este artigo investiga os principais determinantes das relações turco-americanas durante a Guerra Fria, centrando-se nos principais eventos e políticas que influenciaram as interações bilaterais. Pretende compreender o impacto da Doutrina Truman, do Plano Marshall, das alianças da NATO, da questão de Chipre e do conflito Curdo nestas relações. O estudo também avalia criticamente o papel dos lobbies étnicos, como as comunidades armênia e grega, na definição da política externa dos EUA em relação à Turquia.

**Método:** Utilizando uma análise histórica abrangente, esta pesquisa baseia-se em diferentes fontes, incluindo discursos e correspondências oficiais, bem como em fontes secundárias, como livros acadêmicos, artigos de

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periódicos e teses. Esta abordagem metodológica permite uma exploração aprofundada da complexa interação entre a política interna e a diplomacia internacional.

**Conclusão:** O estudo revela que as relações turco-americanas durante a Guerra Fria foram moldadas por uma combinação de alianças estratégicas, conflitos regionais e influências políticas internas. Políticas fundamentais como a Doutrina Truman e o Plano Marshall foram fundamentais para solidificar a Turquia como um aliado crítico, enquanto acontecimentos como a questão de Chipre e o conflito curdo apresentaram desafios significativos. A influência dos lobbies étnicos também desempenhou um papel crucial na definição das relações bilaterais.

**Implicação da Investigação:** Os conhecimentos obtidos com esta análise fornecem lições valiosas para futuros esforços diplomáticos, enfatizando a necessidade de cooperação, diversificação de parcerias e alinhamento estratégico. Compreender o contexto histórico das relações turco-americanas pode informar a diplomacia atual e futura, ajudando a navegar pelas complexidades desta relação bilateral.

**Originalidade da investigação:** Esta investigação oferece um exame único e abrangente das relações turco-americanas durante a Guerra Fria, incorporando uma avaliação crítica das políticas estratégicas e da influência dos lobbies étnicos. Ao fornecer uma compreensão diferenciada desses fatores, o estudo contribui com insights originais para o campo das relações internacionais e da análise da política externa.

**Palavras-chave:** Relações Turco-Americanas, Guerra Fria, Doutrina Truman, Plano Marshall, Lobbies Étnicos.

“**DINÁMICA DE LA GUERRA FRÍA: LA INTERACCIÓN ESTRATÉGICA DE LAS RELACIONES TURCO-ESTADOUNIDENSES”**

**RESUMEN**

**Propósito:** Este artículo investiga los principales determinantes de las relaciones turco-estadounidenses durante la Guerra Fría, centrándose en eventos y políticas clave que influyeron en las interacciones bilaterales. Su objetivo es comprender el impacto de la Doctrina Truman, el Plan Marshall, las alianzas de la OTAN, la cuestión de Chipre y el conflicto kurdo en estas relaciones. El estudio también evalúa críticamente el papel de los lobbies étnicos, como las comunidades armenia y griega, en la configuración de la política exterior de Estados Unidos hacia Turquía.

**Método:** Utilizando un análisis histórico integral, esta investigación se basa en diferentes fuentes, incluidos discursos y correspondencias oficiales, así como fuentes secundarias como libros académicos, artículos de revistas y tesis. Este enfoque metodológico permite una exploración en profundidad de la compleja interacción entre la política interna y la diplomacia internacional.

**Conclusión:** El estudio revela que las relaciones turco-estadounidenses durante la Guerra Fría estuvieron determinadas por una combinación de alianzas estratégicas, conflictos regionales e influencias políticas internas. Políticas clave como la Doctrina Truman y el Plan Marshall fueron fundamentales para consolidar a Turquía como un aliado fundamental, mientras que acontecimientos como la cuestión de Chipre y el conflicto kurdo presentaron desafíos importantes. La influencia de los lobbies étnicos también jugó un papel crucial en la configuración de las relaciones bilaterales.

**Implicación de la investigación:** Los conocimientos adquiridos a partir de este análisis brindan lecciones valiosas para futuros esfuerzos diplomáticos, enfatizando la necesidad de cooperación, diversificación de asociaciones y alineación estratégica. Comprender el contexto histórico de las relaciones turco-estadounidenses puede informar la diplomacia actual y futura, ayudando a navegar las complejidades de esta relación bilateral.

**Originalidad de la investigación:** Esta investigación ofrece un examen único y completo de las relaciones turco-estadounidenses durante la Guerra Fría, incorporando una evaluación crítica tanto de las políticas estratégicas como de la influencia de los lobbies étnicos. Al proporcionar una comprensión matizada de estos factores, el estudio aporta conocimientos originales al campo de las relaciones internacionales y el análisis de la política exterior.

**Palabras clave:** Relaciones Turco-Estadounidenses, Guerra Fría, Doctrina Truman, Plan Marshall, Lobby Étnico.
1 INTRODUCTION

After the end of World War II, a new era in international relations began, known as the Cold War. The main actors of this period were the United States, as the leader of Western values, and the Soviet Union, as the leader of the communist system. During this period, despite various tensions around the world, bipolarity contributed to maintaining international strategic balances, thus avoiding conflicts and clashes on a larger scale. Turkey, with its strategic location—on the border between communism and the Western world—and its traditionally disciplined army, which even the great powers envied, was considered a key state in the eyes of both world powers (Lesser, 1992, pp. 32; Makovsky, 2000; Uslu, 2004; Robins, 1991; Mastny, 1996; Fuller, 1993). Turkish-American relations during the Cold War—unlike the period of the two world wars, where mutual relations did not differ with any particular dynamism—are considered very active and dynamic with regional and international reflections. During this period, events occurred and factors emerged that had significant effects on Turkish-American relations. This article will analyze the most important factors and events, such as the Korean War and NATO, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Syrian Crisis, Jupiter ballistic missiles and U-2 flights, lobbying groups, the PKK, the Cyprus issue, and the Gulf War, which determined, and some of which still determine, Turkish-American relations. Turkish-American relations during the Cold War were influenced by a complex interplay of strategic interests, political alliances, and regional dynamics. This article aims to investigate the primary determinants of these relations, examining how specific policies and events, such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO alliances, the Cyprus issue, and the Kurdish conflict, shaped the bilateral interactions between Turkey and the United States. It also considers the role of ethnic lobbies, particularly the Armenian and Greek communities, in influencing U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study is guided by several key research questions:
What were the main factors influencing Turkish-American relations during the Cold War?

How did specific policies and events, such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, shape these relations?

What role did ethnic lobbies play in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey?

How did military alliances and conflicts, including the Cyprus issue and the Kurdish conflict, affect bilateral relations?

2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This article employs a historical-analytical methodology, utilizing primary sources such as government documents, speeches, and official correspondences, as well as secondary sources including academic books, journal articles, and theses. The research involves a critical review of existing literature on Turkish-American relations, complemented by qualitative analysis of key events and policies. This multifaceted approach provides a comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between domestic politics and international diplomacy in shaping bilateral relations.

3 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on Turkish-American relations during the Cold War provides a rich tapestry of insights into the geopolitical and strategic imperatives that drove bilateral interactions. Baskın Oran's Türk Dış Politikası (2002) offers an extensive overview of Turkey's foreign policy, highlighting its strategic maneuvers and partnerships. Oran emphasizes Turkey's geopolitical position and its influence on regional stability. Nasuh Uslu's Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (2004) examines the continuity and changes in Turkey's international relations, providing insights into the evolution of Turkish diplomacy beyond the Cold War. This work underscores the shifts in Turkey's foreign policy objectives in response to global political changes. İdris Bal's 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (2004) explores Turkey's contemporary foreign policy challenges and strategies, connecting past policies to present-day issues. Bal discusses the impact of regional conflicts and alliances on Turkey's strategic decisions. Philip Robins' Turkey and the Middle East (1991) provides an in-depth analysis of Turkey's interactions with its Middle Eastern neighbors, contextualizing its regional role. Robins highlights the complexities of Turkey's relationships with neighboring countries and
their impact on broader foreign policy. Graham Fuller's Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (1993) explores Turkey's strategic importance across multiple regions, emphasizing its geopolitical significance. Fuller discusses Turkey's role in bridging Europe and Asia and its implications for international relations. Ian Lesser's Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War (1992) discusses the complexities of Turkey's relationship with the West, highlighting the duality of its role as both a bridge and a barrier. This work examines Turkey's efforts to balance its Western alliances with regional ambitions. Alan Makovsky's Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy (2000) examines the shifts in Turkish foreign policy, particularly in response to regional and global changes. It includes contributions from various scholars, providing diverse perspectives on Turkey's diplomatic strategies. Additional significant works include Steve Marsh and Bruce Dobson's US Foreign Policy Since 1945 (2001), which provides a detailed account of American foreign policy decisions and their implications for international relations, including Turkey. Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation's Turkey Between East and West (1996) explores Turkey's strategic position between Europe and Asia and its impact on regional stability. Kemal Girgin's T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız (1923-1993) (1993) offers a historical overview of Turkey's foreign policy as reflected in government programs, highlighting key policy shifts. These works collectively provide a multifaceted understanding of Turkish-American relations, incorporating perspectives on military alliances, economic cooperation, and regional dynamics.

4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This article builds on the theoretical perspectives of realism and liberalism to analyze Turkish-American relations. Realism focuses on the strategic and security imperatives driving state behavior, emphasizing the importance of military alliances and power dynamics. Realism posits that states act primarily in their own interest to maintain security and power within an anarchic international system. This perspective is crucial in understanding the strategic decisions made by both Turkey and the U.S., such as Turkey's accession to NATO and the deployment of U.S. military bases in Turkey. Liberalism, on the other hand, highlights the role of economic cooperation, international institutions, and domestic influences such as ethnic lobbies in shaping foreign policy. Liberalism suggests that states can achieve mutual benefits through cooperation and institutions that help mitigate anarchy's constraining effects. This perspective is essential for analyzing the economic aspects of Turkish-American relations, such as the Marshall Plan's impact on Turkey and the influence of ethnic lobbies like the Armenian
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and Greek communities on U.S. foreign policy. By integrating these theoretical perspectives, this article provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors influencing Turkish-American relations during the Cold War. The combination of realism and liberalism allows for a nuanced understanding of how strategic, economic, and domestic factors intertwined to shape the bilateral relationship.

5 SEEDS OF ALLIANCE: THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND MARSHALL PLAN

In the aftermath of World War II, European economies were plunged into severe recession and crisis. These conditions facilitated the rise of communist influence even in the heart of Europe, causing considerable alarm among American policymakers. During this period, Italian communists emerged as a powerful political force from 1946 onwards. The first cabinet of the Fourth Republic in France included five communist ministers, and Yugoslavia was aligning with communism. Greece, economically weakened and struggling with reconstruction, faced deep problems with communist militant groups, edging closer to civil war. Turkey faced direct and indirect threats from the Soviet Union concerning the Bosporus and its territorial integrity. The Soviets aimed to achieve long-held aspirations for access to warm waters (the Mediterranean Sea), control of trade routes across three continents (Asia, Europe, and Africa), establish Soviet military bases in Turkey, and increase Russian influence over the Middle East, particularly regarding oil sources (Oran, 2002, pp. 531; Fuller, 1993, pp. 76; Turan, 2003, pp. 27). In these circumstances, on March 12, 1947, U.S. President Harry Truman, in a speech before Congress, emphasized the need to provide economic aid to Greece and Turkey to strengthen their economic and military capacities and prevent the spread of communist ideology, which was primarily promoted by the Soviet Union. After extensive debates in Congress, on May 22, 1947, the law known as the "Act for Assistance to Greece and Turkey" was signed by the President. This law provided approximately $300 million to support the Greek economy and military and about $100 million to bolster the Turkish army. Following the enactment of this law, on July 12, 1947, Ankara officially agreed to accept American economic assistance. This strategic move by the Americans marked the beginning of an intensified and deepened relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. As a result of this new era in bilateral relations, Turkey began to develop new foreign policies, especially towards the Middle East, supporting Western, specifically American, strategies and interests in this vital region. The newly created economic and military dependence of Turkey on the U.S., as a consequence of this doctrine, led to a shift in Turkey's traditional strategic positions on Middle Eastern disputes.
For example, Turkey's official stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict changed, with Ankara becoming the first Muslim country to recognize the independence of the newly formed state of Israel, a move that damaged Turkish-Arab relations (Oran, 2002, pp. 532, 533, 535, 537; Turan, 2003, pp. 28). The Truman Doctrine had positive implications for Western states. Through the successful implementation of this strategic step by the U.S., it was demonstrated that opposition to communist ideology could be achieved only through economic and military structures. At the same time, this doctrine can be considered the conceptual foundation upon which similar economic and military structures and organizations, such as NATO, the Baghdad Pact, SEATO, and the Marshall Plan, were later formed (Oran, 2002, pp. 535). In the post-World War II period, the European continent was on the brink of being overrun by communist ideology, which sought to expand its ideological, political, economic, and military presence in this part of the world by exploiting political disunity and the deep economic crisis resulting from the war. During these critical historical moments, when the futures of many nations and states were being reshaped, American authorities began developing a new strategy aimed at political unification and economic recovery and revitalization of the European continent (Marsh, 2001). According to American officials, political unification and economic development of Europe could prevent the spread of communist ideology and open new markets for American exports. The first signs of this new strategy emerged in 1947, when U.S. Secretary of State George S. Marshall, in his speech at the prestigious Harvard University, highlighted the importance of implementing this new strategy. This new plan, later named the Marshall Plan, had several key characteristics: Economic Focus: The assistance was purely economic, without military aspects; Continental Scope: Unlike the targeted aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan aimed to assist the entire European continent; U.S. Opposition to Soviet Interference: The plan emphasized the U.S.'s open opposition to any attempts to hinder economic assistance, serving as a warning to the Soviet Union.

Despite Soviet opposition, European countries, led by the UK and France, decided to meet in Paris for detailed negotiations on the implementation of the American plan. On July 12, 1947, representatives from Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and France met in Paris and, at the request of the U.S., decided to form the Conference of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) to better identify Europe's needs. Following the identification of economic problems, the U.S. decided to provide $17 billion in economic assistance. The "Economic Cooperation Act," signed by President Truman on April 3, 1948, facilitated this assistance. Between 1948 and 1952, under the Marshall Plan, Turkey received approximately $352 million
in economic aid, a sum significantly lower than the $615 million requested by Turkish authorities. American officials justified the lower amount by pointing to Turkey's relatively better economic indicators compared to other European countries still suffering from the war's aftermath (Oran, 2002, pp. 540, 542; Turan, 2003, pp. 30). The American aid to Turkey, initiated by the Truman Doctrine and continued through the Marshall Plan, positively impacted Turkey's military and economic capacities. However, this assistance also increased Turkey's dependence on the U.S., making its foreign policy increasingly aligned with American strategies and interests.

6 STANDING UNITED: THE ROLE OF NATO AND MILITARY COOPERATION

Until the end of World War II, Turkey remained neutral. However, in 1945, due to diplomatic pressures, Turkey declared war on Germany, securing its place in the new world order. Post-World War II, Ankara began crafting policies aimed at closer alignment with the Western world to mitigate the Soviet threat. Soviet threats to Turkey intensified daily. The non-aggression pact between Turkey and the Soviet Union, signed before World War II, expired in 1945 and needed renewal. However, the Soviets attached conditions to the renewal, directly threatening Turkey's territorial integrity. Key Soviet demands included changes to the borders in Eastern Turkey, the establishment of a base at the Bosporus, and revisions to the Montreux Convention. These demands were rejected by Turkey, prompting Ankara to strengthen its ties with the U.S. as quickly as possible (Oran, 2002, pp. 547). In this context, it can be said that the threats from the Soviet Union to Turkey after World War II were one of the main reasons for Turkey's rapprochement with the West, particularly the United States. Under these circumstances, one of the most important objectives of Turkish foreign policy was integration into the Western political and security system. In May 1950, Turkey applied for membership in NATO, but this request was immediately rejected. Following this failure, on June 29, 1950, Turkey responded positively to the UN's call to send troops to Korea, aiming to facilitate its path to NATO membership. During the war, Turkey, alongside Greece, submitted a second application for full integration into NATO on August 1, 1950. However, this application was also rejected. Although countries like the United States, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands supported Turkey's membership, there were NATO member states with differing views on the matter. The United Kingdom preferred to see Turkey as a strong ally in the Middle East rather than a NATO member. Additionally, some NATO members, such as Norway and Denmark, held cultural stereotypes, believing that a Muslim country like Turkey could not be
part of a Christian club (Çakmak, 2004, pp. 246-247). Nevertheless, the U.S., as a superpower, supported Turkey's accession to NATO for several reasons: Soviet Threat: The Soviet Union's emergence as a nuclear power posed a threat to U.S. security and interests. The U.S. needed to establish military bases near the Soviet Union, and Turkey was a favorable location for this purpose. However, Turkish authorities did not approve this project, citing their non-membership in NATO. Therefore, according to the U.S., Turkey's accession to NATO was strategically important on a global scale. Regional Security: For the U.S., Turkey's membership in NATO was crucial for the security of the Balkans and the Middle East. After the deterioration of Yugoslav-Soviet relations in 1948, Yugoslavia was under constant security pressure from the Soviet Union. According to U.S. authorities, Turkey's membership in NATO would ensure a more secure Balkans and a safer Yugoslavia under NATO protection, thereby safeguarding American strategic interests. Additionally, the U.S. aimed to protect its interests in the Middle East, given Turkey's geographic proximity to the region's oil reserves. The most significant factor for the U.S.'s positive stance on Turkey's NATO membership was Turkey's contribution of approximately 5,000 troops to the Korean War, fighting alongside American forces against communist forces. Turkish military assistance, particularly the sacrifices made by Turkish soldiers in support of American troops, such as in the Battle of Kunuri, provided sufficient motivation for American authorities and the public to solidify their support for Turkey's integration into the Western collective security system (Oran, 2002, pp. 548-549). The Korean War can be considered one of the most important factors in U.S. support for Turkey's full integration into the NATO alliance in 1952. However, the question arises whether it was necessary for Turkey to send troops to Korea to integrate into NATO, considering that Greece, although not part of the Western forces in Korea, also joined this organization. Turkey's situation differed from that of Greece. Firstly, Turkey faced direct threats from the Soviet Union. Additionally, Turkey's accession faced significant resistance from some NATO members due to ideological and cultural reasons. Turkey's immediate participation in the Korean War alongside the U.S. was a significant impetus for the positive American stance on this issue.

On the other hand, in the early second half of the 20th century, Turkish-American relations encountered new challenges in the Middle East, which had direct and indirect implications for their future. During this period, the Middle East became a battleground for the strategic maneuvers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S. introduced the concept of the Baghdad Pact to curb the spread of communist ideology and the Soviet Union's expansionist policies in the region. According to American authorities, the formation of this
defensive pact should originate from the regional states themselves, as direct American involvement would contradict U.S. strategic interests. The U.S. administration's reluctance to be directly involved was based on concerns about increasing tensions among Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Soviet Union, all of whom were opposed to this idea (Kürkçüoğlu, 1972, pp. 51; Girgin, 1993, pp. 6). As a result of the U.S.'s strategy to contain the Soviet Union and its ideology in the Middle East, initial steps were taken. On February 25, 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement in Baghdad, forming the Baghdad Pact. The agreement allowed membership for countries directly related to Middle Eastern security and peace, while excluding non-recognized states. This enabled the inclusion of the United Kingdom and excluded Israel, hoping to gain support from the Arab world. With the inclusion of Pakistan, Iran, and the UK, the number of member states increased to five. However, the pact did not yield the expected results. First, it lacked support from most Arab states, led by Egypt, where Nasser claimed the idea contradicted Arab ideals. Second, Israel opposed the pact, viewing it as counter to its national interests. Third, Arab public opinion perceived the UK and Turkey as protecting Western interests over regional ones. Lastly, Arabs viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as the primary threat, not communist ideology. On July 14, 1958, a coup in Iraq led to the deaths of the king, his deputy, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said. This coup was organized by "leftist groups" motivated and supported by Moscow. Following the coup, Baghdad Pact member states sought U.S. assistance to maintain order and peace in the Middle East. On July 28, 1958, the U.S. responded positively, leading to a meeting in London. Subsequently, the U.S. signed a security and defense cooperation agreement with the Baghdad Pact members, effectively becoming part of the defense system. In 1959, Baghdad announced its withdrawal, leaving the organization without any Arab states. The Baghdad Pact was then renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) (Soysal, 1999, pp. 518; Kürkçüoğlu, 1972, pp. 65-67; Fuller, 2008). The initiatives to prevent the spread of communist ideology in the Middle East could not succeed without American assistance and support. Simultaneously, U.S. aid to Turkey in its Middle East policy negatively affected Turkey's credibility in the region. American support turned Turkey into an "ideal instrument" for achieving U.S. strategic goals in the eyes of Middle Eastern nations and governments. In 1957, the U.S. began implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine, which primarily focused on American interests in the Middle East. This doctrine aimed to strengthen relations between the U.S. and Middle Eastern countries and assist in their economic recovery to maintain their independence from the Soviet Union. It also empowered the U.S. president to initiate military intervention in the region to defend American strategic interests. The Soviet Union, Egypt, and Syria sharply rejected this doctrine, while Turkey, Iraq, Libya,
Lebanon, Iran, and Pakistan welcomed it. The UK faced the reality that Middle Eastern leadership was shifting to the U.S. as a result of this doctrine. The Eisenhower Doctrine had many positive effects on Turkey. Increased U.S. military and economic support, and the growing importance of the Incirlik Air Base for American interests in the Middle East, were beneficial outcomes for Turkey. However, the doctrine also strained Turkey's relations with some Middle Eastern states. The Syrian Crisis of 1957, resulting from the implementation of the new American doctrine in the region, exemplifies this. Following the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Syria began receiving substantial arms supplies from the Soviet Union, alarming Turkey, which claimed this threatened its stability and security. Turkey responded by massing troops along the Syrian border, sparking the Syrian Crisis (Bal, 2004, pp. 675). During the crisis, Syria, having signed defense agreements with the Soviets in 1957, secured Soviet support, while Turkey was backed by the U.S. The U.S. State Department's statement in response to Soviet threats against Turkey underscored American commitments under NATO: "Regardless of distance, there is no doubt that the U.S. will fulfill its obligations to its ally Turkey under NATO." By the end of 1957, Soviet threats subsided, and Syria united with Egypt, reducing the perceived threat to Turkey. These events were seen by Turkish authorities as a diminishment of the Syrian threat, easing tensions and ending the crisis (Oran, 2002, pp. 631-632; Turan, 2003, pp. 34-36).

The 1960s marked a period of heightened tensions between the Soviet Union, Turkey, and the United States. The primary reasons for the deterioration of relations were the deployment of American Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey and the launch of American U-2 reconnaissance flights from Turkish territory to monitor Soviet military capabilities. In 1957, the Soviet Union began launching rockets into space, carrying the Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2 satellites. According to American authorities, this event confirmed that the Soviets possessed medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, which posed a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the United States. In response, President Eisenhower proposed deploying American Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, on the territories of all NATO member states. Eisenhower believed this step would strengthen the alliance's military capabilities against the Soviet nuclear threat. However, most NATO members, fearing Soviet propaganda and potential security consequences, disagreed with the American strategy. Only Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Italy agreed to host American ballistic missiles on their territories (Oran, 2002, pp. 572; Turan, 2003, pp. 38). One significant outcome of the deployment of American ballistic missiles in Turkey was the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), one of the most dangerous confrontations between the two superpowers (the U.S. and the Soviet
Union) during the Cold War. The crisis began when the Soviets placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, posing a direct threat to the U.S. security system from the communist bloc for the first time. The American missiles in Turkey became a crucial bargaining chip for the Soviet Union. Despite the high tension between the two superpowers, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove the Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba, conditional on the removal of American nuclear missiles from the UK, Italy, and Turkey. This demand was met by American authorities, ending one of the most critical moments of the Cold War. This event underscores Turkey's role as a "wing country" in the NATO alliance, holding a vital place in American strategic plans. Another significant event in Turkish-American relations in the 1960s was the downing of American U-2 aircraft, which conducted surveillance flights over Soviet territory. The importance of this event lies in the fact that the U-2 planes, shot down by Soviet air defense (in 1960 and 1965), took off from the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. As a result of Soviet threats, Turkey was compelled to request the American political establishment to halt the surveillance flights. The request was accepted, and all American surveillance flights from Incirlik ceased, easing the tense relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey caused by the U-2 flights (Oran, 2002, pp. 573-574; Turan, 2003, pp. 42-45).

7 ETHNIC POWER PLAY: ARMENIAN AND GREEK LOBBIES IN TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Ethnic lobbying groups are considered the most influential in the United States. These groups are organizations founded by immigrant communities in the U.S. that engage in lobbying activities. The success of an ethnic lobby can be measured by the number of people it represents and its economic power. Public opinion support is also crucial for the effective operation of lobbying groups in the U.S. For example, the Arab lobby, despite its significant economic capacity, is considered weaker than the Jewish lobby due to a lack of public support. Successful ethnic lobbies in the U.S. must meet several conditions: Their policies should not oppose American national policy; They should be integrated into American society and part of its political activities.; They must have political unity; American society should believe that the lobby's values are acceptable and well-founded (Özsoy, 1998, pp. 240-245). The Jewish lobby is considered the most influential ethnic organization in the U.S., with significant economic, political, intellectual, and media resources. This influence has resulted in continuous political, economic, and military assistance from the U.S. to Israel. The Jewish lobby's successful influence can be seen in the lack of UN measures against Israel despite its violations of
international law, such as the Gaza invasion (2008-2009), which resulted in thousands of civilian casualties without accountability (Özsoy, 1998, pp. 240-245). Alongside the Jewish lobby, Armenian and Greek lobby organizations are also significant, particularly concerning Turkish-American relations. The Armenian issue in Turkish foreign policy dates back to the late 19th century when Armenians from the Ottoman Empire emigrated to the U.S. During this period, Armenians in the U.S. began organizing and forming various organizations that, according to Ottoman authorities, acted against the interests of the Ottoman Empire. These activities included supporting rebellion and providing economic assistance to their compatriots fighting for independence from the Empire. These rebellious activities not only worsened relations between the Ottoman Empire and Armenians but also negatively impacted Ottoman-American relations. Under the 1830 Treaty between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire, an Armenian with American citizenship was granted "protected" status upon returning to the Empire, exempting them from Ottoman laws. This provision was interpreted differently by Ottoman authorities, leading to disputes when Armenians claimed protected status to avoid legal and financial obligations in the Empire. For example, Guedjian, an Armenian American arrested in Aleppo in 1895 for being a member of the Armenian revolutionary group Hunchak, was retried in Istanbul with the presence of the American consul due to his American citizenship (Kılıç, 2004, pp. 253-254, 256-257). During World War I, Armenians, taking advantage of the Ottoman Empire's engagement in battles in the Caucasus, Syria, and Çanakkale, initiated a rebellion with external support, leading to massacres of civilians across Ottoman territories. In 1915, the Ottoman Empire decided to deport Armenian rebel groups to Syria, then under Ottoman control. After the war, the Empire allowed Armenians to return voluntarily, although many emigrated to various countries, including the U.S., forming the Armenian diaspora. This diaspora has been a persistent issue in Turkish foreign policy, particularly in Turkish-American relations. In 1970, the Armenian diaspora formed the terrorist group ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), aiming for the recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide and the establishment of Greater Armenia. Between 1973 and 1984, ASALA killed around 42 Turkish diplomats worldwide. In 1984, the Armenian Assembly of America united all Armenian organizations in the U.S., marking a new era of Armenian lobbying in the country. Despite representing only one million Armenians in the U.S., the Armenian lobby's religious affiliation, capacity for rapid and effective contacts, support from the Greek lobby, and concentration in specific areas contribute to its success. The Armenian lobby also has excellent contacts with other prominent American organizations, such as Amnesty International, International Human Rights Organizations, and the Kurdish National Congress. Unlike Turkey,
which spends about $10 million annually on lobbying, the Armenian lobby spends around $45 million. With around 450 Armenian organizations, they have strengthened their position in disputes such as the so-called Armenian genocide and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Karabakh (Ari, 2009; Külebi, 2005, pp. 21). The recognition of the Armenian genocide by 42 U.S. states and the 2010 resolution by the U.S. Congress's Foreign Affairs Committee acknowledging the so-called genocide are seen as successes of the Armenian lobby. Despite intensive Armenian lobbying against Turkish interests and its successes in many U.S. states, Turkish-American relations are not entirely held hostage by these events. Turkey's political and diplomatic influence in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, along with its economic growth despite global crises, strengthen Turkish-American relations. The Greek lobby is another significant group in the U.S., playing a crucial role in shaping American foreign policy. The Greek lobby has historically influenced Turkish-American relations, particularly after the Cyprus War (1974), where Greek lobbying efforts turned global public opinion against Turkey. As a result of these efforts, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, and the UN condemned the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (Özsoy, 1998, pp. 248-230). Ethnic lobbies, particularly Armenian and Greek, have periodically influenced Turkey's international relations and Turkish-American relations, often exacerbating tensions. While Turkey's lobbying efforts in the U.S. are increasing, there is still room for improvement to protect Turkish interests more effectively. The Turkish government's proactive diplomatic strategies should prioritize more robust and influential lobbying efforts in the U.S.

8 STRAINS FROM WITHIN: THE KURDISH CONFLICT'S INFLUENCE ON BILATERAL TIES

The origins of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) can be traced back to 1974 in Ankara, when Abdullah Öcalan, along with his associates Kesire Yıldırım, Musa Erdoğan, Ali Haydar Kaytan, Haki Karer, Cemil Bayık, Ali Özer, Kemal Pir, and Mustafa Dere, members of the Ankara Higher Education Association (Ankara Yükseks Öğrenim Derneği - AYÖD), laid the foundations of the Marxist-Leninist organization PKK. In 1977, Öcalan published a pamphlet titled "The Path for the Kurdish Revolution," in which he argued that Kurdistan was divided among colonial states—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. According to Öcalan, Kurds are a nation entitled to live independently. He advocated for achieving this goal through military strategies led by the Kurds of Turkey. In 1978, in the village of Fis near Diyarbakir, Öcalan and his followers decided to form the PKK. In December 1978,
it was announced that under Öcalan's leadership, the PKK was established with the aim of creating an independent Kurdistan. On August 15, 1984, the PKK launched its first attacks in Eruh and Şemdinli, marking the beginning of PKK terrorism against the Turkish state and people. The years 1984-1989 were marked by intense terror campaigns conducted by the PKK, targeting the population of southeastern Turkey, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Kurds. The PKK's leadership believed that raising Kurdish awareness of their rights and mobilizing them through violence was necessary. Another goal of these bloody actions was to undermine state authority and establish the PKK as the dominant power in the region. By the late 1980s, the PKK had become a feared regional power among the local population in southeastern Turkey (Yılmaz, 2007, pp. 46-47; Aktaş, 2006, pp. 51; Bal, 2007, pp. 76-77). Despite significant successes by the Turkish military against the PKK, the Gulf War and the weaponry left behind by the Iraqi military provided significant opportunities for the terrorist organization. After the Gulf War (1991), in which the U.S. played a leading role, the absence of state authority in northern Iraq created a safe haven for PKK members, enhancing their strategic and military capabilities. The weapons left by the defeated Iraqi army further empowered the PKK in its terrorist activities against Turkish military and civilian targets. These factors strengthened the PKK's position but also increased Turkish dissatisfaction with U.S. policies (Yılmaz, 2007, pp. 46-47; Aktaş, 2006, pp. 51; Bal, 2007, pp. 76-77). Following the guerrilla warfare strategy from 1989 to 1995, the PKK shifted back to intense terrorism, this time targeting major Turkish cities like Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Antalya, and Adana. This strategy aimed to incite nationalistic feelings among Turks against Kurds, hoping to isolate Kurds and push them towards the PKK. However, this strategy also failed to achieve its goals, and strong Turkish-Kurdish relations resisted terrorist provocations. In 1999, the capture of Öcalan marked the end of this strategy. Öcalan's capture, coordinated by Turkish, American, and Israeli intelligence, had positive effects on Turkish-American relations, boosting the Turkish public's satisfaction with American policies (Aktaş, 2006. pp. 51-52; Bal, 2007, pp. 78). After 1999, particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the PKK decided to halt its violent activities. In this new context, the PKK leadership, fearing U.S. wrath in its war on global terrorism, ordered its members to relocate to northern Iraq. However, post-2003, as Turkish-American relations deteriorated, the PKK found new strategic and political opportunities. Utilizing the differences in American and Turkish views on Iraq, the PKK reactivated its terrorist activities within Turkey. The U.S. viewed Kurds and Shiites in Iraq as allies, while Turkey opposed the war in its neighbor and was concerned about the U.S. policies favoring Kurdish groups (Aktaş, 2006. pp. 51-52; Bal, 2007, pp. 79). In 2007, Erdogan's visit to the White House helped to mend the strained Turkish-American
relations post-2003, leading to increased cooperation against the PKK. During the Bush-Erdogan meeting, the U.S. President labeled the PKK as a terrorist organization to be combated. This agreement led to intelligence sharing and U.S. support for Turkish military actions against PKK targets in northern Iraq. In 2008, the Turkish military entered northern Iraq and eliminated many PKK strongholds. Cooperation continued during Obama's administration, but despite initial improvements, the collaboration yielded limited results, leading to ongoing uncertainties in Turkish-American relations. The weak outcomes were manifested in the continued successful terrorist attacks and delays in intelligence sharing. Given the strategic interests, Turkish-American cooperation against the PKK needs to be strengthened, considering the U.S.'s need for Turkish support in its fight against global terrorism.

9 A DIVIDED ISLAND: THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND ITS DIPLOMATIC REPERCUSSIONS

In 1964, Turkey issued an ultimatum to Cypriot leader Makarios to cease attacks on Turkish Cypriots and lift sieges. This was rejected, and Turkey prepared for military intervention. U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a stern letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, warning that NATO might not protect Turkey against Soviet retaliation and prohibiting the use of American weapons in Cyprus (Güney, 2002, pp. 25-27; Oran, 2002, pp. 685; Turan, 2003, pp. 46). Following Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, the U.S. Congress imposed a military embargo on Turkey on February 5, 1975, despite opposition from President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. The embargo was driven by the belief that Turkey's invasion was illegal and that American weapons were used improperly (Oran, 2002, pp. 705-706). The embargo led to Turkish backlash, including the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and the suspension of American base operations in Turkey. This strained Turkish-American relations, causing mutual distrust and pushing Turkey to diversify its arms sources and develop domestic defense production (Oran, 2002, pp. 707-708; Turan, 2003, pp. 49-50). Efforts to lift the embargo were initially unsuccessful until its repeal on September 12, 1978, influenced by the geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and Iran's revolution. The embargo ultimately failed to achieve its goals, further damaging U.S. credibility in Turkey and impacting Turkish military modernization (Oran, 2002, pp. 689-690). These events underscore how the Cyprus issue has periodically strained Turkish-American relations and influenced Turkey's foreign policy direction. Turkey's foreign policy stance on the Cyprus dispute sparked significant reactions within the American political establishment. Beyond
Johnson's letter, which marked a pivotal moment in Turkish-American relations, the U.S. military embargo on Turkey served as a practical punishment by its NATO ally. On August 16, 1974, following Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military wing in protest of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, the UN Security Council labeled Turkey as an occupier and demanded its immediate withdrawal from the island. On February 5, 1975, the U.S. Congress imposed a military embargo on Turkey, despite opposition from President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, influenced by the Greek lobby (Oran, 2002, pp. 705-706). The Watergate scandal and Congressional criticisms of Nixon's policies in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Chile motivated Congress to act independently of the executive branch. Congress justified the embargo, arguing that Turkey's invasion lacked legal basis, American weapons were used improperly, and the embargo was necessary to compel Turkish forces to withdraw from Cyprus (Oran, 2002, pp. 705-706). The executive branch, led by Ford and Kissinger, viewed the embargo as counterproductive, potentially worsening the Cyprus situation, jeopardizing U.S. bases in Turkey, and conflicting with the principle of separation of powers. Despite their efforts, Congress implemented the embargo, halting arms sales and $200 million in aid to Turkey. In response, Turkey established the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975 and later suspended the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S., disrupting American base operations in Turkey (Oran, 2002, pp. 707-708; Turan, 2003, pp. 49-50). Efforts to lift the embargo included a failed Senate attempt and a new defense cooperation agreement in 1976, which was rejected by Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. The embargo was eventually lifted on September 12, 1978, and a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed on March 29, 1980. Turkey's reaction to the embargo, alongside the Iranian revolution, influenced this decision. The embargo failed to change Turkey's strategy on Cyprus, leading instead to the formation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and hindering the modernization of the Turkish military. It also spurred Turkey to develop its domestic defense industry and damaged the U.S.'s reputation in Turkey.

10 THE GULF WAR'S RIPPLE EFFECT: TRANSFORMING TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Following the Vietnam War, which left deep marks on the political, strategic, and military history of the U.S., as well as on the American people, the Gulf War provided the U.S. with an excellent opportunity to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome" and reassert itself as the world's sole superpower. Concurrently, the Gulf War is seen as the first step in post-Cold War
cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey. During the Gulf crisis, collaboration with regional actors was considered crucial for U.S. success. Turkey, as a key player in the Middle East, was at the forefront of the U.S. administration’s agenda for cooperation. During the Gulf crisis, the U.S. made three official requests to Turkish authorities: Permission to use bases in Turkey for airstrikes against Iraqi targets; deployment of more Turkish ground forces to the Turkish-Iraqi border to divert Iraqi forces from the Kuwaiti battlefield; sending Turkish troops to Saudi Arabia to join coalition forces. Turkey responded positively to the first two requests but rejected the third despite President Özal’s support. Consequently, on January 17, 1991, the Turkish parliament authorized the use of NATO bases by U.S. air forces. The Incirlik base played a vital role in U.S. air operations against Iraqi targets, and Turkey deployed around 180,000 troops to the Turkish-Iraqi border, causing a strategic shift in Iraqi military focus (Ökmen, 2007, pp. 85-88; Oran, 2002b, pp. 255). The Gulf War brought significant changes to Turkey’s internal and external policies. Domestically, there were intense reactions against Özal’s policy, leading to resignations from key ministers and military officials. Despite these challenges, Özal remained a central figure in shaping Turkey's foreign policy during the war. The Gulf War was a pivotal moment in Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War era. Turkey's support for UN decisions and actions during the war, similar to its role in the Korean War, reaffirmed its alliance with the West, particularly the U.S. (Oran, 2002b, pp. 255). However, the war also inflicted substantial economic and political damage on Turkey. Initially, Özal anticipated significant economic benefits, but the reality was starkly different. Turkey faced severe financial and economic losses throughout the 1990s due to the crisis (Oran, 2002b, pp. 255). The international embargo on Iraq caused annual losses of about $5 billion for Turkey. The cessation of trade with Iraq, halted transit benefits from the Yumurtalık pipeline, unpaid Iraqi debts, and increased unemployment in southeastern Turkey were among the most significant economic setbacks (Oran, 2002b, pp. 255). Additionally, the influx of around 500,000 Kurdish refugees from Northern Iraq to the Turkish border, fearing Saddam Hussein’s threats, spurred Kurdish nationalism among Turkish Kurds. The loss of state authority in Northern Iraq and rising unemployment in Southeastern Turkey created favorable conditions for the PKK's terrorist activities. This new post-Gulf War context turned the Kurdish issue from a local to a global concern and intensified efforts to establish a Kurdish state, which continues to worry Turkish authorities (Oran, 2002b, pp. 258; Fuller, 2008, pp. 188-189; Arı, 2003, pp. 455; Aydin, 2005, pp. 222-245; Ergil, 2001, pp. 161-195; Lundgren, 2007; Nachmani, 2003, pp. 33-55; Özcan, 2006, pp. 54-73). One of the most controversial issues in the post-Gulf War period was the role of international military forces known as Operation Provide Comfort and their mission.
to establish a safe haven for Kurds. Following the war, Iraqi forces began clashing with Kurdish and Shiite insurgent groups aiming to overthrow Hussein's regime. This offensive led to a large number of refugees, with about 500,000 Kurds settling along the Turkish-Iraqi border. According to Turkish authorities, their entry into Turkish territory was contrary to the state's strategic interests. Despite these concerns, international pressure and public opinion compelled Turkey to accommodate these refugees in camps within its territory (Oran, 2002b, pp. 258; Fuller, 2008, pp. 188-189). Özal's international diplomatic efforts led to UN Security Council Resolution 688, calling for intensified humanitarian aid for the Kurds. On April 10, 1991, the U.S. declared a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort, led by the U.S., the U.K., and France, aimed to establish a safe haven near Zakho, allowing Kurdish refugees to return to Northern Iraq. The second phase of the operation, known as Operation Provide Comfort II or Çekiç Güz, involved deploying quick reaction forces in Turkey to prevent potential Iraqi attacks on the Kurdish population. This mission, renewed every six months, sparked significant debate in Turkey. Supporters argued that it strengthened Turkish-Kurdish relations, weakened PKK activities, and reinforced Turkish-American relations. Opponents believed the mission ultimately aimed to support the PKK and facilitate the creation of a Kurdish state (Oran, 2002b, pp. 260-263; Arı, 2003, pp. 458-461; Uslu, 2004, pp. 280). While Özal's approach to the Gulf War strengthened strategic relations between Turkey and the U.S. and enhanced Turkey's regional influence, it did not significantly benefit Turkish strategic interests. Instead, the war caused economic and political problems that continue to be analyzed by Turkish scholars today.

11 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis of Turkish-American relations during the Cold War reveals a complex interplay of strategic interests, political alliances, and regional dynamics. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were pivotal in establishing Turkey as a critical ally of the United States in the region, providing economic and military support that bolstered Turkey's position against Soviet influence. These policies cemented Turkey's strategic alignment with the West, creating a framework for sustained cooperation. The NATO alliance further solidified this relationship, though it was not without challenges. The Cyprus issue, particularly the U.S. arms embargo following Turkey's intervention, strained relations significantly. This period marked a shift towards a more independent Turkish foreign policy, characterized by efforts to diversify military and economic partnerships. The embargo highlighted the fragility of the alliance and
underscored the need for Turkey to develop a more self-reliant defense strategy. Ethnic lobbies, particularly the Armenian and Greek communities, played a significant role in shaping U.S. policy towards Turkey. Their influence was evident in the U.S. Congress's decisions on arms embargoes and recognition of historical grievances, impacting bilateral relations and necessitating a more nuanced approach from Turkish diplomacy. These lobbies leveraged their political and economic power to shape U.S. foreign policy, often complicating Turkish-American relations. The Kurdish conflict emerged as another critical factor, with the PKK's activities and subsequent Turkish military responses affecting U.S.-Turkey relations. Cooperation against terrorism became a focal point in the post-9/11 era, though differences in defining and addressing terrorist threats occasionally led to tensions. The U.S. support for Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria further complicated this aspect of the relationship, creating mistrust between the two allies. Continuous engagement through diplomatic channels is essential to address and mitigate conflicts arising from regional issues and ethnic lobby influences. Turkey should continue to diversify its military and economic partnerships to reduce over-reliance on any single ally, thereby enhancing its strategic autonomy. This diversification would not only improve Turkey's resilience but also strengthen its bargaining power in international relations. Both nations should prioritize intelligence sharing and joint operations against common threats, ensuring alignment in counter-terrorism strategies. Establishing clear communication channels and joint task forces can enhance mutual trust and operational effectiveness. Expanding economic ties beyond military aid can foster a more balanced and resilient bilateral relationship, benefiting both nations in the long term. Initiatives such as trade agreements, investment partnerships, and cultural exchanges can build a more robust foundation for future cooperation. In conclusion, Turkish-American relations during the Cold War were shaped by a combination of strategic alliances, regional conflicts, and domestic political influences. Understanding these dynamics provides valuable lessons for future diplomatic efforts, emphasizing the need for cooperation, diversification, and strategic alignment. By learning from the past, both nations can navigate the complexities of their relationship and work towards a more stable and mutually beneficial partnership.

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