HYPONYMY FROM A SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW

Purpose: In this article, by considering the linguistic symbols, the author shows that the recognition of this relation depends on the encyclopedic knowledge of sign users. Theoretical Framework : From the hyponymic point of view, this article concerns signs whose referents are in another possible relations can be expanded to different types of sign. Result and Discussion: The writer used two kinds of signs for showing the truth-value of the assumption. First, signs which are compound and are the result of a selection and combination of different referents. Second, the signs which, by changing the Context B, change their identity and interpretation. Value/Originality: Hyponymy is one of the most well-known lexical relations in lexical semantics world. Accordingly, the aim of this article is to demonstrate how hyponymic lexical and it is possible to generalize this relation to other types of signs in semiotics.


INTRODUCTION
All linguistic semantic theories represent different approaches to lexical semantics (Geeraerts 2010).In these theories, the meaningful unit of language is 'word' and, according to Frege's principle, the meaning of an expression is a function of the meaning of its words (Frege 1892).This means that in linguistic semantics, we consistently deal with the principle of compositionality to interpret the meaning of a sentence.
In linguistic semantic theory, "hyponymy is one of the relations between expressions in structural semiotics which is a paradigmatic relation of sentence" (Lyons 1977: 291).These relations hold between the subordinate lexeme and a superordinate lexeme.The subordinate lexeme is called hyponymy.For instance, the relation between 'rose' and 'flower' is a hyponymic relation in which 'rose' is one of the subordinate lexemes and 'flower' is the superordinate lexeme.Between a superordinate lexeme and the so-called hyponymy, the relation of 'kind' or 'type' is held.For instance, if 'A' is the superordinate and 'B' is the hyponym, then the proposition that 'B' is a kind or type of 'A' is true.
The assumption in structural semantics is that the linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge that language uses is modular.However, this assumption creates issues in recognizing hyponymy because, in many cases, the recognition of hyponymy requires information which is not part of a speakers' linguistic knowledge.For example, we can show the relation between 'lithium: metal', 'diamond: carbon', 'cat: Felix', and so on which do not appear to be part of the linguistic knowledge of the speakers.Furthermore, in many instances, the social and cultural conditions are important to recognize the relation between superordinate and subordinate lexemes.For instance, in Botany, the relation 'cucumber: creeping vive' holds, but, in middle eastern countries, 'cucumber: fruit' is truth.As another example, 'cherry tomato: tomato' in western countries is different than that for countries in eastern Asia whereby the relation is 'cherry tomato: cherry'.Another consideration when dealing with hyponymy is the relation between co-hyponymies.Hyponymy depends on different components of the lexemes.
For example, 'ewe: sheep', 'lamb: sheep' are both in hyponymic relation but 'ewe' and 'lamb' are not.'Ewe' and 'lamb' are both types of 'sheep' but 'ewe' is a subordinate of sheep because of a 'sex' component and 'lamb' is a hyponymy of sheep because of an 'age' component.Other examples could be 'palm: tree' and 'sapling: tree' or 'tulip: flower' and 'bud: flower'.

TEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Hyponymy is one of the most important aspects of linguistics that should be studied, however, the topic of this article is based on the problem that recognized when we deal with the possible world and look at the entities which are human creations.For instance, we can consider the word 'Pegasus' for which there is no certain idea that the relation is 'Pegasus: bird' or 'Pegasus: horse', but we can assume that 'Pegasus' is a kind of 'horse'.However, the problem is not as simple as it seems because there are several examples which demonstrate that iconicity is important to recognize hyponymy.For instance, 'Pink Panther', 'Spiderman', 'Donald duck', and so on.When we mention 'Pink Panther' as a kind of panther, we deal with the formal similarity of this human creation with panthers.However, in this possible world, the panther entity walks like a human, smokes cigarettes, wears a bowler hat, and exhibits many other behaviors similar to human beings.So, when we generalize the lexical sense relation, as an issue in linguistic semantics, and deal with these cases in semiotics, we can see a multitude of other unsolved problems which are important in semiotics.These problems can also be considered for symbols such as conventional signs.For example, is a traffic light a kind of light or traffic sign?In other words, is a traffic light a co-hyponym for 'chandelier' or 'yield triangle '?
The answer for this question seems simple.The traffic light belongs to the sign system of traffic protocols and for this reason it must be a traffic sign and a co-hyponym for the 'give way triangle'.Now suppose that we put one of these traffic lights as a decoration in our house.
What then?Here the answer also seems simple.The light goes out of the traffic sign system and is now a co-hyponym with chandelier.This simple answer is the core of writing this article.
When we argue that a sign is transferred from a specific sign system to another, we conclude that the identity of the sign has changed and that the sign cannot be meaningful without recognizing the context in which it is used.As a result of these explanations, the hyponymy can be generalized to non-verbal signs and this generalization brings us to the question: How can several kinds of signs be meaningful?

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS
To consider a sign a sign, it must have a concept.This 'concept' either maintained with a term 'sense' (Frege 1892), 'signified' (Saussure 1916), 'thought' (Ogden and Richards 1923), or 'intension' (Carnap 1956), has to have a nature and this nature must be identified for us.Safavi (2019) showed that the concept of sign is a set of sentences which are propositions for the definition of that sign.This set of propositions are the narrative for a concept.In other words, a concept is a set of sentences, whereby each sentence contains information about the feature of the 'concept'.These sentences can be an extension or referent in the real world, or can be part of the social or cultural beliefs of a speaker's language.For instance, 'owl is a bird' is a member of the narrative about 'owl' which we commit to our memory for this bird.
However, 'owl is ominous' or 'owl is wise' belongs to the social and cultural beliefs which change from one society to the another.
According to Safavi (2019Safavi ( ,2024)), the utterance grasped by the addressee is a set of signs which the concept of each is a narrative of one or few sentences.Thus, if we assume that this utterance is called Context A, then for the interpretation of this utterance we need information from two other contexts.Firstly, Context B which is a new term for the context of a situation and is comprised of a set of members (i.e., sentences).Secondly, Context C which is also a set of sentences and is a new term representing a synonym for the background knowledge of the addressee.
The receiver of the message will select a sentence or sentences from Context C and Context B to combine with Context A in order to interpretate the message.This interpretation must be relevant to the intention of the addresser.For instance: (1) The blanket is in the closet.
Suppose that a sender uttered the sentence (1), and the receiver must interpret this message.The receiver needs to know the units formed in this message.For knowing these units, the receiver must have sentences stored in her/his Context C. Furthermore, the receiver needs to use information grasped from Context B. According to this assumption, these are sentences from Context B which are activated for the interpretation of Context A. For example, 'it is cold' and so on.Thus, the receiver selects sentences from their Context C, combines them with the sentence or sentences from Context B, and then uses these sentences in combination with Context A (i.e., the message) for interpretation.So, the process of communication can be summarized as follows ( 1 must be naturalized and changed to information which are social (for the receiver).This naturalized message will be uttered as Context A to the receiver.The receiver, with the goal of grasping the intention of the sender, must then select appropriate information from its Cr and Br in combination to Context A and interpret the message.
In the process of producing Context A, most of the information in Cs and Bs must be naturalized.For example, the sender of message (1) must ignore all the individual information of what they mean by 'blanket' and only use the general term.The receiver of message (1) will also interpret the message by means of individual information.So, the 'blanket' may be a specific kind of blanket but this information will be unmarked because Context A could not include all the information of Cs and Bs.

DISCUSSION
In the problem statement section of this article, the author discussed about the human creation in a possible world.In this possible world, the creations can have a referent close to or far from the real world.For instance, the creation of a solider in a possible world (e.g., a movie) who, as a solo fighter, kills hundreds of enemies without a scratch, is far from the real world, whereas the creation of 'Saturn' in a possible world is not far from the real world.
According to hyponymy, is 'Spiderman' one of the hyponymies of 'human' or is he a kind of 'spider'?Is 'Pegasus' a sort of 'horse' or one of the hyponymies of 'bird'?Based on the aforementioned assumption, the 'concept' of each sign is a set of sentences which forms the narrative of that sign.If we ask any sign user about the concept of a sign, they would use a set of sentences to explain its concept.When we know the concept of a sign, it means we have stored sentences in our memory.Examples (3) and ( 4) can explain: (3).Pegasus the sender, with the goal of conveying an intention to the receiver, selects information from Context C [=Cs].In selecting Cs, the sender needs to pay attention to Context B [=Bs].The specific features of information, which are individual (to the sender),